Epstein Secrets

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 1169

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 1169

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 1169

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 1169

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 1169

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

e mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty, 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male, 211 F.3d 1169 (