Epstein Secrets

e inflicted by Moammar Gaddafi. This humanitarian imperialism quickly became an exercise in regime change. But the prolonged attempt to assassinate Gaddafi from the air made no provision for a replacement regime. The Benghazi committee should hear from Alan J. Kuperman of the Lyndon B. Johnson School

6984 the hope of attracting an intervention. This increased the rate of killing there tenfold. And since Gaddafi fell, "sophisticated weapons from Gaddafi's arsenal — including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012 — leaked to radical Islamists throughout the reg

ain Iraq does not become wholly dependent on Iranian aid and that the US will play an important role in shaping the operational environment. Iran's Revolutionary Guards are already in Iraq advising and assisting the government on the military operations. Iran has openly declared its ability and EFTA00706980 inten

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block •. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make any

ally could find their way to terrorists if the regime collapses. In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly was

sewhere. That would require a degree of organization and infrastructure. Iran already has the means and EFTA00686842 capability to do this, using Revolutionary Guards from the Quds Force or Hezbollah, its Lebanese terrorist surrogates. Al-Qaeda, which has established a front inside Syria, has expressed an interes

d to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN- EFTA_R1_00228271 EFTA01841735 backed NATO interv

s influence throughout the region. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah in Lebanon would welcome those developments. Already there are reports that Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah fighters have supported the pro-Assad forces, and both would have strong incentives to back an Alawite insurgency against a Sunni-dom