Epstein Secrets

rorists if the regime collapses. EFTA_R1_00230154 EFTA01842830 In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly wa

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block U.N. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make a

TA01842835 business in Israel, and engagement with any company or individual that does business with firms on the Arab League blacklist. Although the U.S. Congress took measures to counteract this boycott, and the Damascus Bureau may be temporarily preoccupied on other fronts, the boycott momentum has been pi

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block •. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make any

ally could find their way to terrorists if the regime collapses. In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly was

ty that does business in Israel, and engagement with any company or individual that does business with firms on the Arab League blacklist. Although the U.S. Congress took measures to counteract this boycott, and the Damascus Bureau may be temporarily preoccupied on other fronts, the boycott momentum has been pic

ining one up EFTA_R1_02209210 EFTA02723324 properly, fearing that it could rise against him someday. During the Libyan revolution, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi blamed the Libyan army for its violent handling of the demonstrators. According to Saif al-Islam, the army was reckless because it was not properly

ealed to them for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is almost farcical. In the year 2000, Muammar Gaddafi wanted to declare a war on Israel, yet he had no qualified army to do so. He never considered training one up EFTA_R1_02209210 EFTA02723324 prop

uslims and Copts." Their goal, according to the dossier, was: "Bringing down the ruling regime in Egypt, no matter what it is," while "pandering to the U.S. Congress, Jewish lobbyists and American public opinion." Amazing. What Abul Naga is saying to all those young Egyptians who marched, protested and died in

s and, on present evidence, a bloody stalemate that further destabilizes the region. It's distasteful to contemplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands. But this approach is worth exploring if it can foster a transition to a democratic go

per year from Washington, and it was unclear whether the PA and its president, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, could survive without it. As a result, the U.S. Congress responded to Hamas' 2006 electoral victory by passing the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act (PATA), which conditioned assistance to the PA on a presid

ntervention has a particularly strong chance of going wrong. The Assad regime has a powerful army, and more domestic and international support than Gaddafi had in Libya. If fighting escalates in Syria, the risk of a prolonged civil war is considerable. The fact that many outside powers, from Iran to Sa

y is that conditions for a compromise on both sides in terms of the domestic politics in both countries are not ripe for negotiations. For example, the U.S. Congress is contemplating the possibility of demanding suspension of Iran's enrichment program as part of any negotiation. That is a condition that Iranians

o do so. He never considered training one up properly, fearing that it could rise against him someday. During the Libyan revolution, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi blamed the Libyan army for its violent handling of the demonstrators. According to Saif al-Islam, the army was reckless because it was not properly

uslims and Copts." Their goal, according to the dossier, was: "Bringing down the ruling regime in Egypt, no matter what it is," while "pandering to the U.S. Congress, Jewish lobbyists and American public opinion." Amazing. What Abul Naga is saying to all those young Egyptians who marched, protested and died in

tervention has a particularly strong chance of going wrong. The Assad regime has a powerful army, and more domestic and international support than Gaddafi had in Libya. If fighting escalates in Syria, the risk of a prolonged civil war is considerable. The fact that many outside powers, from Iran to S

is that conditions for a compromise on both sides in terms of the domestic politics in both countries are not ripe for negotiations. For example, the U.S. Congress is contemplating the possibility of demanding suspension of Iran's EFTA_R1_00230068 EFTA01842763 enrichment program as part of any negotiation.

to be false. A more persuasive explanation—get ready for this shocker—is that Iran really wants a bomb. The regime believes, not unreasonably, that Moammar Gadhafi would still be in power had he not given up his nuclear program in 2003. Mr. Khamenei also fears a "velvet revolution" scenario, in which more normal

es offer to reduce sanctions in exchange for Iranian concessions, the White House would have had to find a new candidate for defense secretary. It's the U.S. Congress that arguably holds the high cards, though the White House put them in its hands. The most potent sanctions are legislated, and have been written in

talked about in Washington, like an embarrassing relative. In North Africa, the US military has taken a back seat while the work of toppling Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and driving back the jihadists in Mali has been left to Franco-British forces. Syrian policy is one of drift, where the administration finds all opti

to be false. A more persuasive explanation— get ready for this shocker—is that Iran really wants a bomb. The regime believes, not unreasonably, that Moammar Gadhafi would still be in power had he not given up his nuclear program in 2003. Mr. Khamenei also fears a "velvet revolution" scenario, in which more normal

tes offer to reduce sanctions in exchange for Iranian concessions, the White House would have had to find a new candidate for defense secretary. It's the U.S. Congress that arguably holds the high cards, though the White House put them in its hands. The most potent sanctions are legislated, and have been written in

talked about in Washington, like an embarrassing relative. In North Africa, the US military has taken a back seat while the work of toppling Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and driving back the jihadists in Mali has been left to Franco-British forces. Syrian policy is one of drift, where the administration finds all opti

ians and, on present evidence, a bloody stalemate that further destabilizes the region. It's distasteful to contemplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands. But this approach is worth exploring if it can foster a transition to a democratic gover

and Syria. In both cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of th

ion per year from Washington, and it was unclear whether the PA and its president, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, could survive without it. As a result, the U.S. Congress responded to Hamas' 2006 electoral victory by passing the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act (PATA), which conditioned assistance to the PA on a presiden