Epstein Secrets

e inflicted by Moammar Gaddafi. This humanitarian imperialism quickly became an exercise in regime change. But the prolonged attempt to assassinate Gaddafi from the air made no provision for a replacement regime. The Benghazi committee should hear from Alan J. Kuperman of the Lyndon B. Johnson School

6984 the hope of attracting an intervention. This increased the rate of killing there tenfold. And since Gaddafi fell, "sophisticated weapons from Gaddafi's arsenal — including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012 — leaked to radical Islamists throughout the reg

by itself spawn something new and workable to take its place is just that, mere hope. In his Delphic interview with Time, former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi put it this way: "The world is now much more difficult than it was during your revolution. It's even more difficult. The world. More complicated,

cently-overthrown Muslim Brotherhood President of Egypt, than Obama had with any other Arab leaders. They were happy when Washington ousted Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, and then unnerved when Washington simply walked away from the resulting chaos and extremism. And they certainly have not been reassured b

is truly spooking them. Obama and his minions have been all over the lot. Arab leaders were, frankly, shocked that Obama had far more contact with Mohamed Morsi, the recently-overthrown Muslim Brotherhood President of Egypt, than Obama had with any other Arab leaders. They were happy when Washington ousted

side it. Today, Palestinian groups can dip into Libya's military arsenal that collapsed and is now available after EFTA_R1_00462172 EFTA01976181 Gaddafi's elimination, by being smuggled through Egypt — currently too distracted with the revolution and a painful and agonising transitional phase. It is

the conflict without it spinning out of control. The hope was not off base. In August, Egyptian President Mohamed EFTA_R1_00462169 EFTA01976178 Morsi had retired the military's top brass and taken full control of Egypt's foreign and security police. The development was particularly significant gi

to be false. A more persuasive explanation—get ready for this shocker—is that Iran really wants a bomb. The regime believes, not unreasonably, that Moammar Gadhafi would still be in power had he not given up his nuclear program in 2003. Mr. Khamenei also fears a "velvet revolution" scenario, in which more normal

oes not succeed him. The corruption allegations levelled by Mr Ahmadinejad against the Larijani family are deeply damaging to the Iranian regime. Mr Morsi, meanwhile, has little to show Egyptians that he has improved their lot. Cairo is the scene of near-constant street battles and the economy is tankin

talked about in Washington, like an embarrassing relative. In North Africa, the US military has taken a back seat while the work of toppling Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and driving back the jihadists in Mali has been left to Franco-British forces. Syrian policy is one of drift, where the administration finds all opti

to be false. A more persuasive explanation— get ready for this shocker—is that Iran really wants a bomb. The regime believes, not unreasonably, that Moammar Gadhafi would still be in power had he not given up his nuclear program in 2003. Mr. Khamenei also fears a "velvet revolution" scenario, in which more normal

does not succeed him. The corruption allegations levelled by Mr Ahmadinejad against the Larijani family are deeply damaging to the Iranian regime. Mr Morsi, meanwhile, has little to show Egyptians that he has improved their lot. Cairo is the scene of near-constant street battles and the economy is tankin

talked about in Washington, like an embarrassing relative. In North Africa, the US military has taken a back seat while the work of toppling Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and driving back the jihadists in Mali has been left to Franco-British forces. Syrian policy is one of drift, where the administration finds all opti