Epstein Secrets

rorists if the regime collapses. EFTA_R1_00230154 EFTA01842830 In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly wa

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block U.N. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make a

us field of conflict mediation. It has tried, and usually succeeded, in calming tempers and forging agreements between opponents — whether between Eritrea and Yemen in their dispute over the Hamish Islands in 1996; or between Eritrea and Sudan a couple of years later; or between Yemen and its Huthi r

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block •. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make any

ally could find their way to terrorists if the regime collapses. In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly was

ous field of conflict mediation. It has tried, and usually succeeded, in calming tempers and forging agreements between opponents — whether between Eritrea and Yemen in their dispute over the Hamish Islands in 1996; or between Eritrea and Sudan a couple of years later; or between Yemen and its Huthi re

ntervention has a particularly strong chance of going wrong. The Assad regime has a powerful army, and more domestic and international support than Gaddafi had in Libya. If fighting escalates in Syria, the risk of a prolonged civil war is considerable. The fact that many outside powers, from Iran to Sa

n. Saudi funding was particularly instrumental in supporting anti-Soviet (and EFTA00686805 anti-Libyan) operations and alliances in Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Somalia. But the Saudis didn't simply counter communism. They fueled a generation of zealous Islamist fighters who later caused bigger proble

tervention has a particularly strong chance of going wrong. The Assad regime has a powerful army, and more domestic and international support than Gaddafi had in Libya. If fighting escalates in Syria, the risk of a prolonged civil war is considerable. The fact that many outside powers, from Iran to S

stan, and Sudan. Saudi funding was particularly instrumental in supporting anti-Soviet (and anti-Libyan) operations and alliances in Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Somalia. EFTA_R1_00230055 EFTA01842750 But the Saudis didn't simply counter communism. They fueled a generation of zealous Islamist fighter