Epstein Secrets

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the firstFranks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showingof a false statement or om

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "'[a]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily co

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), lijt has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

edure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), '[i]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

cedure grant the Court authority to strike surplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts within the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments."' United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez,

United States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 145 United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 126 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) 166, 168 United States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) passim United States v. Balde, 20 Cr. 281 (KPF) 298 U

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

United States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 145 United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 126 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) 166, 168 United States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) passim United States v. Balde, 20 Cr. 281 (KPF) 298 U

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

United States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 100 United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 88 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) 113, 114 United States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) passim United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C

ited States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 145 United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 126 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) 166, 168 United States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) passim United States v. Balde, 20 Cr. 281 (KPF) 298

w, the motions should be denied in their entirety. First, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C