Epstein Secrets

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1992, 2002, Hofbauer 1999). Evolutionary graph theory is an extension of spatial games to more general popu- lation structures and social networks (Lieberman et al 2005, Ohtsuki et al 2006a,b, Pacheco et al 2006, Szabo & Fath 2007, Taylor et al 2007a, Santos at al 2008, RI et al 2008). The members of the

this is the probability that a newly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium cond

Science, 303, 793-799. 0.14] Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K., 2005. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 427, 1291- 1298. (115] Ohtsuki H, Hauert C, Lieberman E, Nowak MA, 2006a. A simple nile for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature, 441, 502-505. [116] Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y

equivalent to PA C 1/N, where PA is the fixation probability of an A mutant in a population of B individuals (Nowak et al 2004a, Ohtsuki et al 2007, Imhof et al 2006, Lessard and Ladret 2007). The above condition can thus be interpreted as follows: in a 2 x 2 game with mixed strategies, pure strategy