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1992, 2002, Hofbauer 1999). Evolutionary graph theory is an extension of spatial games to more general popu- lation structures and social networks (Lieberman et al 2005, Ohtsuki et al 2006a,b, Pacheco et al 2006, Szabo & Fath 2007, Taylor et al 2007a, Santos at al 2008, RI et al 2008). The members of the

ly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium condition no longer implies evolutionary s

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s of finite size (Schaffer 1988, Kandori et al 1993, Kandori & Rob 1995, Schreiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Scheuring 2006, Imhof & Nowak 2006, Lessard & Ladret 2007). Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent M