Epstein Secrets

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m