Epstein Secrets

ch and to whom. The administration could change course and decide that living with Assad is better than the danger of a fragmented Syria overrun by Al Qaeda- backed jihadists. (Former CIA Director Michael Hayden endorsed that option last week, telling a Washington audience that it might be "the best ...

again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. factions in the opposition. Meanwhile, other forces were competing for influence in the Syrian snake pit, too. Al Qaeda and its allies sponsored jihadist groups that imported aspiring terrorists from Iraq and other countries. Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Persian Gu

overnment decided to vent its anger with the Obama Administration's Syria policy by issuing statements in the Western press and by refusing to join the United Nations Security Council as a rotating member (after two years of lobbying vigorously for the post), Riyadh tried an alternative method of advancing its interests in the Le

cy project fail. So no matter the original reasons for the war, in the end, it came down to this: Were America and its Iraqi allies going to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies in the heart of the Arab world or were Al Qaeda and its allies going to defeat them? Thanks to the Sunni Awakening movement in Iraq,

of the Arab plan on December 19. Expectations by most regional experts and officials are that sooner or later the Syrian file will be referred to the United Nations Security Council, and a Turkish-led international military intervention would be inevitable. However, the resilience of the Syrian regime has surprised many, but so

vot to Asia that is failing to deter a rising China; a newly assertive Russia seizing territory without consequence; cuts in defence spending while al-Qaida franchises pop up across the Middle East and perhaps the worst of all sins — failure to stop the bloodletting in Lyria. It's a policy that Niall Fe

own. They are consistent with American policy since 1967. If packaged as an American plan, they'd likely gain the support of the European Union and the United Nations Security Council. All Kerry has to do—not a small thing—is embrace them and call them his own, much as President Obama haltingly did in 2011, when he argued for "th

egated to the nebulous realm of •. diplomacy and Geneva conferences, where Secretary of State John Kerry lives. Let's suppose for the moment that al-Qaeda's new base in eastern Syria, Hezbollah's deployment of tens of thousands of missiles in Lebanon and the crumbling of the U.S.-fostered Iraqi politic

e United States on certain issues. That came just days after Saudi Arabia stunned even some of its own diplomats when it refused a rotating seat on the United Nations Security Council, citing its anger over the world's failure to respond to the crisis in Syria. This spat reflects the Arab world's deepening frustration with Americ

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

gone, nearly run out." But some American and European officials still buy the fantasy that Mr. Assad could yet implement reforms. Most appalling, the United Nations Security Council is unable to muster the votes to condemn the bloodshed much less impose sanctions. Russia, cynically protecting longstanding ties with Damascus, i

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

gone, nearly run out." But some American and European officials still buy the fantasy that Mr. Assad could yet implement reforms. Most appalling, the United Nations Security Council is unable to muster the votes to condemn the bloodshed much less impose sanctions. Russia, cynically protecting longstanding ties with Damascus, i

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

gone, nearly run out." But some American and European officials still buy the fantasy that Mr. Assad could yet implement reforms. Most appalling, the United Nations Security Council is unable to muster the votes to condemn the bloodshed much less impose sanctions. Russia, cynically protecting longstanding ties with Damascus, i

triggered a campaign of violence from the majority Sunnis that includes a growing Islamist element and takes in Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi and even al-Qaeda- affiliated factions. Despite President Obama's "reset" policy, Russia continues to support [4] Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime. But in a rare admis

the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem; that track has proved harder than expected. Last September, Mr. Abbas was unable to get enough members of the United Nations Security Council to vote yes for recognizing Palestine as a state. He did gain membership in Unesco, a United Nations agency, but that led the United States to cut

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

gone, nearly run out." But some American and European officials still buy the fantasy that Mr. Assad could yet implement reforms. Most appalling, the United Nations Security Council is unable to muster the votes to condemn the bloodshed much less impose sanctions. Russia, cynically protecting longstanding ties with Damascus, i