Epstein Secrets

her judge's decision to allow the Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a "substantial basis" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238- 39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional circ

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

her judge's decision to allow the Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a "substantial basis" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238- 39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional circ

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

her judge's decision to allow the Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a "substantial basis" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238- 39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional circ

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

her judge's decision to allow the Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a "substantial basis" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238- 39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional circ

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

her judge's decision to allow the Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a "substantial basis" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238- 39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional circ

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre