Epstein Secrets

squirm and hope to be delivered from any meaningful burdens. Still, they are meeting Friday in Tunis to discuss their options. But Syrian dictator Bashar al- Assad needn't worry. The Tunisian hosts themselves proclaimed that this convocation held on their soil precluded a decision in favor of foreign

he Syrian Regime. The former, a large group—the United States, the Europeans and the bulk of Arab governments—is casting about for a way to end the Assad regime's assault on its own people. In their ranks there is irresolution and endless talk about the complications and the uniqueness of the Syrian

The absolute priority within no-kill zones would be public safety and humanitarian aid; revenge attacks would not be tolerated. Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, is increasingly depending on government-sponsored gangs and on shelling cities with heavy artillery rather than overrunning them with troops, prec

nd Yemen. In Istanbul this month, I encountered the variety, and the normalcy, of this rebellion in extended discussions with prominent figures of the Syrian National Council. There was the senior diplomat who had grown weary of being a functionary of so sullied a regime. There was a businessman of means, from Aleppo, w

s and even critical discussions are limited. Russia, Iran, and China remain supportive. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states tried last year to detach Bashar al-Assad from his ties to Iran, EFTA00712622 but without success. In this effort, they tipped their hand in supporting autocracy over democracy in the reg

tor in 2007. And it has close links to the Iranian regime, which is the No. 1 enemy of the U.S. and its allies in the region. Moreover, the longer Assad stays in power without being able to stop the uprising against his government — which is now more than a year old — the greater the odds that region

re is an important step the United States can take to change Israel's calculations -- helping the people of Syria in their battle against President Bashar al-Assad's regime. Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem unconnected, but in fact they are inextricably linked. Israel's real fear -- losing i

ition. Once the opposition knows real outside help is on the way, it should be possible over time to build a coherent political leadership based on the Syrian National Council as well as a manageable command and control structure for the Free Syrian Army, both of which are now weak and divided. This will be difficult and

e moral bankruptcy of its foreign policy, has reaped a harvest of consistency and single-mindedness. It has entirely and unwaveringly supported the Bashar Al-Assad regime, used its status as a permanent United Nations Security Council member to veto any opposing resolution, and has provided superior weaponry t

onal feebleness in response to the Iranian nuclear program. But the takeaway message on Syria is that in all of the circumstances, awful though the Assads were and disreputable and unacceptably motivated though their Iranian and Russian sponsors are, it is not clear that an objectively preferable alte

, and it is all terribly confused because of murky or obscure differences and terminological subtleties, as in the withdrawal, three months ago, of the Syrian National Council from the Syrian National Coalition. Many of the more moderate forces (great caution should be used in applying that word anywhere in the Middle Ea

is achieved we will seek at Geneva ways of better dealing with the terrible internal humanitarian situation. International aid goes to the needy in Assad controlled areas where the population is greater and apparently lesser amounts to the non-Assad controlled areas where the need is probably greater

orst conflict so far this century. Meanwhile, the international community has been disastrously divided. Since the fighting began, Syrian President Bashar Assad has had Russia's explicit international support. But while Russia's strategy, from the outset, has been coherent and well- defined, the West's has n

I conference offers an opportunity to address these dangers. But risks abound. We still do not know who will represent the Syrian opposition, or if the Syrian National Council — which demands that Assad step down unconditionally — will even be there. The regime, for its part, wants the conference to focus on combating the

secretary-general Annan's plan for a political settlement was announced, the Turkish leadership made it clear that there could be no solution with Assad in power. With this policy of direct confrontation, Ankara not only strove to obtain the moral high ground. It also sought to precipitate the fall

most inevitably be pulled in to invest in the future stability and territorial integrity of Syria. EFTA00713329 With its long-standing support to the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army, Ankara hopes to have gained the leverage to influence the behavior of the future leadership in the post-Assad era. But no