Epstein Secrets

udi Arabia and Qatar, bolstered by Turkey and the West, seem ready to stop at nothing to violently overthrow a fellow Arab head of state, President Bashar al-Assad - and to do whatever they can to hurt Iran. Iranians increasingly interpret Saudi Arabia's mood as a hungering for war; and Gulf statements do oft

A02720382 The Saudi king may aspire to unify the Sunni world to his vision, but he is unlikely to succeed in this way: his harsh vendetta towards Assad is not unifying the region, it is souring it; and the recourse to militant Sunnism is fomenting civil, violent struggle in many states: in the Leva

last Tuesday at the Brookings Institution. Iran's former nuclear spokesman and a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to 2005, Mousavian was later arrested and tried for espionage by the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Today, Mousavian is a research scholar at Princeton

egotiating team from 2003 to 2005, Mousavian was later arrested and tried for espionage by the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Today, Mousavian is a research scholar at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. Everyone recalls that regime change was the stated U.S. pol

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs,

ther. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't g

. This intriguing proposal lacks official Iranian support, but it would address Israel's biggest concern and would surely interest U.S. officials. Mousavian also notes Iran's willingness to allow much wider inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into what are known as "possible mil

tic needs, and any enriched uranium would either be converted immediately to the needed fuel rods or panels, or it would be exported. In exchange, Mousavian argues, the P5+1 would recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium and would gradually lift sanctions. This intriguing proposal lacks official Iranian

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs

her. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't

. This intriguing proposal lacks official Iranian support, but it would address Israel's biggest concern and would surely interest U.S. officials. Mousavian also notes Iran's willingness to allow much wider inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into what are known as "possible mil

_R1_02211647 EFTA02724641 uranium would either be converted immediately to the needed fuel rods or panels, or it would be exported. In exchange, Mousavian argues, the P5+1 would recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium and would gradually lift sanctions. This intriguing proposal lacks official Iranian