Epstein Secrets

to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al- Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11"

Syria Peace Conference Editorial Article 2. NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Art

sitional administration by "mutual consent" of the Assad government and the opposition. In the view of the United States, this means that President Bashar al-Assad would be replaced, although Assad government officials and his Alawite sect could be part of the new structure. Iran has refused to accept any pre

te-led Iran as well EFTA00651249 as Russia, which is fighting extremists in the Caucasus and worrying about attacks during the Winter Olympics in Sochi next month. Mr. Zarif acknowledged this problem generally, asserting that "the continuation of this tragedy in Syria can only provide the best bree

squirm and hope to be delivered from any meaningful burdens. Still, they are meeting Friday in Tunis to discuss their options. But Syrian dictator Bashar al- Assad needn't worry. The Tunisian hosts themselves proclaimed that this convocation held on their soil precluded a decision in favor of foreign

he Syrian Regime. The former, a large group—the United States, the Europeans and the bulk of Arab governments—is casting about for a way to end the Assad regime's assault on its own people. In their ranks there is irresolution and endless talk about the complications and the uniqueness of the Syrian

The absolute priority within no-kill zones would be public safety and humanitarian aid; revenge attacks would not be tolerated. Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, is increasingly depending on government-sponsored gangs and on shelling cities with heavy artillery rather than overrunning them with troops, prec

s expansionist ambitions; and the rise of political Islam across the Arab world. These were among the topics vigorously debated at a conference at Sochi on Russia's Black Sea coast, held on 17-18 February in the grandiose marble halls of a 22-hectare resort -- with its own elevator to the beach belo

wakening, the current administration has taken successive positions on Egypt—all to little effect. And when the president of the United States says Assad "must go," but has no idea how to achieve this (and later does nothing when Assad crosses the chemical-weapons red line)—well, it does not inspire

s more valuable than the cash was the public show that Obama couldn't keep his allies in line and happy. Not Russia— EFTA00678196 Putin would back Bashar al-Assad till the very end which, given American impotence, virtually guaranteed Assad's survival. By the time Putin offered Obama a joint initiative to rid

nd the next day Saudi Arabia responded with a statement condemning Russia and stating, "[Vladimir] Putin has lost Arab hearts with his support for [Bashar al-]Assad." The fight spilled over into the Saudi Twittersphere the moment Russia moved into Crimea, with Saudi hashtags accusing Russia of moving

here was only a political solution to the crisis, said the White House, and Russia had the answers. Accordingly, traditional U.S. allies flocked to Sochi to petition Putin for relief. The Saudis promised to buy $15 billion worth of Russian arms if only the Russians would temper their support for Assa

Another Syria Peace Conference Editorial I NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Ar

to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al-Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11" countries s

ld act as a multiplier on social and economic pressures already at play and undermine stability." ■ "Yehia does not believe that the [government of Bashar al- Assad] will allow any Syrian citizen to starve. ... However, Yehia told us that the Syrian minister of agriculture ... stated publicly that eco

threat to Shiite-led Iran as well as Russia, which is fighting extremists in the Caucasus and worrying about attacks during the Winter Olympics in Sochi next month. Mr. Zarif acknowledged this problem generally, asserting that "the continuation of this tragedy in Syria can only provide the best bre

l settlement in Syria has vanished. The United States needs an alternate strategy for strengthening Syrian moderates who can resist both the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime and al- Qaeda extremists. A new Syrian opposition leader who may help get the balance right is Jamal Maarouf. He heads a group called the S

rategy that sounded more pragmatic than anything I've heard from the opposition in recent months. Maarouf says his forces must simultaneously fight Assad's army and the fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islami tat of Iraq and Syria, two jihadist groups with al-Qaeda roots. That's easier said tha

s; he sent an underling—former EFTA00684183 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano—to represent the United States as the Winter Olympics in Sochi and a delegation headed by gay athletes to protest a recent Russian law banning gay "propaganda." Obama's sending Napolitano was a gratuitous snub

le, including by the repeated use of chemical weapons, and yet has remarkably culminated in the re- legitimization of the person responsible for it, Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian civil war— particularly the White House's inept and improvisational response to it—has accidentally transformed Putin into a major powe

military aid to moderate groups in the Syrian opposition, enough to raise their hopes but not enough to ensure success on the battlefield. And when Assad used chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods, Obama threatened military action — only to back off, again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. fact

also gain more leverage with the Kremlin as time goes on and as America's footprint disappears in the Middle East. When Netanyahu met with Putin in Sochi last May, he prevailed upon him not to deliver S- 300 missiles to Assad. At the time, Putin reportedly refused to comply, citing an outstanding cont

erests." The most obvious target is Syria, experts said, where President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia would be even less likely to abandon President Bashar al-Assad. Mr. Putin, most of the experts agreed, would probably follow through on the agreement with the United States to remove Mr. Assad's chemical weapon

esident Bashar al-Assad. Mr. Putin, most of the experts agreed, would probably follow through on the agreement with the United States to remove Mr. Assad's chemical weapons, if only to preserve Russia's national prestige. But the Russians would most likely drop any pretense of negotiating a politica

. No one is going to war over the Crimea, including the Ukraine. But there should be a political and economic price. Not going to the G-8 Summit in Sochi will not impress Putin. He will say he is protecting ethnic Russians and if President Obama and European leaders choose not to go, he will be defia

ago. But Obama's er jection of U.S. military involvement in Syria's civil war, in which 140,000 people have died since he first called on President Bashar al-Assad to step down, is the leading example of his second term. So, too, is the Pentagon budget proposal outlined this past week that would cut the size o

. EFTA00705926 At a G-8 meeting the following year in Northern Ireland, Obama and Putin met and made no headway toward resolving differences over Assad's leadership of Syria. The two exchanged an awkward back-and-forth over Putin's passion for martial arts before the Russian leader summed up the m

en muscled its tiny neighbor, eventually waging a war that ended with Russia taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In a recent Letter from Sochi, I tried to describe Putin's motivations: his resentment of Western triumphalism and American power, after 1991; his paranoia that Washington is so

should attend the Geneva meetings is a straightforward and emphatic "yes", because Iran's assistance to the Syrian government headed by President Bashar al-Assad is crucial for keeping the Damascus government in place. Yet nothing is easy when it comes to finding a diplomatic solution to the war in Syria, be

rs, and is part of, its wider positioning and influence across the Middle East, so it is deeply invested in the current and future condition of the Assad government. Iran has shown beyond doubt that it is prepared to go to great EFTA_R1_02211 207 EFTA02724380 lengths and expend much money, arms, t

in when he travelled to the republic in 2012. The emergence of ethnic Russian jihadists poses a threat to not only the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, but also to Russia as a whole. The jihadist movement spread from the borders of the North Caucasus republics and expanded into Russia proper long

surrection of Al Qaeda.According to the United Nations , 84 percent of the 733 people killed in January were civilians. Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime has led to a series of deadly suicide bombings in Lebanon by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in an attempt to draw the country deeper into Syria

rity Service and Foreign Intelligence Service have been collecting files on Ukrainians for a long time. We would expect that after the Olympics in Sochi, the Russians could play their trump cards. On the other hand, even if the play fails, the United States will have demonstrated that it is back in