Epstein Secrets

ge P. Shultz Article 2. The Daily Beast Memo to Netanyahu: It's Time to Build an Arsenal of Awe Lloyd Green Article 3. Washington Post Ousting Assad may be only the beginning David Ignatius Article 4. Al-Monitor Allen mission key to Israeli-Palestinian security talks Geoffrey Aronson Article

ree to confidence-building measures such as a humanitarian relief corridor to besieged areas. Idriss didn't demand as a precondition that President Bashar al-Assad resign before negotiations begin. Instead, he said, Assad's departure should come "at the end of negotiations." This position was echoed by Monzer

Green was the opposition research counsel to the George H. W. Bush campaign in 1988, and served in the Department o

hreats over the horizon, technology investment and deployment are "must-dos" for both countries. Lloyd Green was the opposition research counsel to the George H. W. Bush campaign in 1988, and served in the Department of Justice between 1990 and 1992. Article 3 Washington Post Ousting Assad may be only the beginn

apital — for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad. In his speech before the non-alignment summit,

cies will push Cairo into EFTA00712755 the camp of the GCC states and Turkey in the context of this Cold War, whose main headline today surrounds Bashar al-Assad's departure or stay. On the other hand, it will also not be easy for Cairo to infiltrate what was achieved by Ankara throughout a decade of its absen

ference, which helped start Nixon's late-career return to respectability, but the two men eventually fell out over Reagan's Soviet policy. In 1989, George H. W. Bush recruited Jimmy Carter to help with policy toward Panama; that helped revive Carter's reputation, but the relationship soured in 1991, when Carter

ttention allowed Iraq's Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, to intensify his persecution of Sunnis. Then, after Syrians rebelled against Bashar al- Assad, the Islamic State expanded across Iraq's western border into Syria, later renaming itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Significantly, when

ation's inattention allowed Iraq's Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, to intensify his persecution of Sunnis. Then, after Syrians rebelled against Bashar al- Assad, the Islamic State expanded across Iraq's western border into Syria, later renaming itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Significa

y operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, did not even exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands stayed to deter Saddam, and to enforce no-fly zone

. Then, after Syrians rebelled against Bashar al-Assad, the Islamic State expanded across Iraq's western

tion's inattention allowed Iraq's Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Malild, to intensify his persecution of Sunnis. Then, after Syrians rebelled against Bashar al-Assad, the Islamic State expanded across Iraq's western border into Syria, later renaming itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Significantly, when

operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, did not even exist. All of this changed in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and President George H. W. Bush dispatched 700,000 troops to expel him and defend Saudi Arabia. After the war was won, thousands stayed to deter Saddam, and to enforce no-fly zones

Those forces have now pushed both the west and Arab governments into taking a much harder line than simply geostrategic logic would dictate against Bashar al-Assad's brutality in Syria, and even (albeit timidly) against torture and killings by the Bahraini government. Social movements are also beginning to resha

ostrategic logic would dictate against Bashar al-Assad's brutality in Syria, and even (albeit timidly)

Interest Foreign-Policy Failure Dimitri K. Simes August 24, 2011 -- PRESIDENT BARACK Obama is in many respects the opposite of Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush, both foreign-policy presidents who subordinated their domestic ambitions to America's national-security requirements. Moreover, where Obama has s

Those forces have now pushed both the west and Arab governments into taking a much harder line than simply geostrategic logic would dictate against Bashar al-Assad's brutality in Syria, and even (albeit timidly) against torture and killings by the Bahraini government. Social movements are also beginning to resha

ostrategic logic would dictate against Bashar al-Assad's brutality in Syria, and even (albeit timidly)

Interest Foreign-Policy Failure Dimitri K. Simes August 24, 2011 -- PRESIDENT BARACK Obama is in many respects the opposite of Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush, both foreign-policy presidents who subordinated their domestic ambitions to America's national-security requirements. Moreover, where Obama has s

on Diehl June 11 -- From one point of view the connection between our troubles with Syria and Iran is pretty straightforward. The Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad is Iran's closest ally, and its link to the Arab Middle East. Syria has provided the land bridge for the transport of Iranian weapons and militants

Israel, would be crippled. It follows that, as the U.S. Central Command chief Gen. James N. Mattis testified to Congress in March, the downfall of Assad would be "the biggest strategic setback for Iran in 25 years." EFTA_R1_02204138 EFTA02720609 Making it happen is not just a humanitarian imperat

reform, and created a separate new department," that of Veterans Affairs. Obama's campaign is well aware that he may end up like Jimmy Carter or George H. W. Bush, the two most recent one-term Presidents, who were both defeated despite some notable—even historic—accomplishments, including the Camp David Accor

professional foreign-policy circles, Obama is often regarded with mistrust. His Syria policy—with its dubious "red line" and threats to get rid of Bashar al- Assad; with John Kerry's improvised press-conference gambit on chemical weapons—has inspired little confidence. Neither did the decision to acc

al foreign-policy circles, Obama is often regarded with mistrust. His Syria policy—with its dubious "red line" and threats to get rid of Bashar al- Assad; with John Kerry's improvised press-conference gambit on chemical weapons—has inspired little confidence. Neither did the decision to accelerate tr

elatively modest executive orders on gun control and some stronger ones on climate change, he has issued the fewest of any modern President, except George H. W. Bush. "Wait, wait, wait," Obama said. "Before everybody starts clapping, that's not how it works. We've got this Constitution, we've got this whole thin

ped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it

tely made no public comment. We refused to say whether we’d had anything to do with an attack. As we he had hoped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it had ever happened, deny that he’d been trying to make a nuclear weapon, and thus feel no compelling

a administration. I knew key figures from earlier incarnations in their public lives and mine: Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who had been President George H. W. Bush’s deputy security adviser 1n the first Iraq war and then head of the CIA; and Hillary Clinton, now Secretary of State. During a series of early trips t

ped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it

tely made no public comment. We refused to say whether we'd had anything to do with an attack. As we he had hoped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it had ever happened, deny that he'd been trying to make a nuclear weapon, and thus feel no compelling

a administration. I knew key figures from earlier incarnations in their public lives and mine: Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who had been President George H. W. Bush's deputy security adviser in the first Iraq war and then head of the CIA; and Hillary Clinton, now Secretary of State. During a series of early trips t