Epstein Secrets

to this week's Syria peace talks in Montreux, Switzerland, does little if anything to change the Assad regime's approach to those talks. President Bashar al- Assad's statements in recent days indicate that he and his backers are attempting to pressure the United States and the rest of the "London 11"

Syria Peace Conference Editorial Article 2. NYT WikiLeaks, Drought and Syria Thomas L. Friedman Article 3. The Washington Institute Avoiding Assad's Forced Solution to the Syria Crisis Andrew J. Tabler Article 4. Now Lebanon Does the US seek an Arab-Iranian "equilibrium?" Hussein Ibish Art

sitional administration by "mutual consent" of the Assad government and the opposition. In the view of the United States, this means that President Bashar al-Assad would be replaced, although Assad government officials and his Alawite sect could be part of the new structure. Iran has refused to accept any pre

ear-armed Iran. Should this be a hard choice? Astonishingly, too many members of Congress seem to think so. Jessica Tuchman Mathews is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. EFTA00651277

rtunity the regime once possessed is being jeopardised by its actions. Brutal repression has overshadowed belated, half-hearted reform suggestions; Bashar has squandered credibility; his regime has lost much of the legitimacy derived from its foreign policy. The international community, largely from

t did not have to be so. The protest movement is strong and getting stronger but yet to reach critical mass. Unlike toppled Arab leaders, President Bashar Assad enjoyed some genuine popularity. Many Syrians dread chaos and their nation's fragmentation. But whatever opportunity the regime once possessed is

ss. Unlike toppled Arab leaders, President Bashar Assad enjoyed some genuine popularity. Many Syrians dr

e Islamic Republic's rise, he is more likely to be remembered by historians as the man who hastened its decay. Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. EFTA_R1_02033710 EFTA02691537 24 Article 6. Foreign Policy Research Institute Russia's Anxieties About The Arab Rev

e missiles, followed by self- congratulation and an attempt to change the topic. It would not work here. A minority regime fighting for its life, as Bashar al- Assad's is, can weather a couple of dozen big bangs. More important, no one — friends, enemies or neutrals — would be fooled. As weak as the Un

put his credibility on the line irrevocably and inescapably; second, he now must take direct military action to punish the government of President Bashar al-Assad, though not in a manner that commits him to further use of force; and third, he needs to combine whatever force he uses now with dramatic and dipl

opposition to doing so (60 percent) among polled Americans, and a growing and potent consensus among foreign policy experts and politicians to give Assad a hard punch. Most administration officials and most Americans just can't see any lasting benefits from any form of direct U.S. military involveme

f aid gets cut off and Egypt says, `We're going to war with Israel,' " said Nathan Brown, a Middle East scholar at George Washington University and the Carnegie Endowment. "Egypt's attitude toward Islamic terrorism — right now, they're on the same page as Fox News." Sure, if aid is suspended gulf states will send mo

squirm and hope to be delivered from any meaningful burdens. Still, they are meeting Friday in Tunis to discuss their options. But Syrian dictator Bashar al- Assad needn't worry. The Tunisian hosts themselves proclaimed that this convocation held on their soil precluded a decision in favor of foreign

he Syrian Regime. The former, a large group—the United States, the Europeans and the bulk of Arab governments—is casting about for a way to end the Assad regime's assault on its own people. In their ranks there is irresolution and endless talk about the complications and the uniqueness of the Syrian

The absolute priority within no-kill zones would be public safety and humanitarian aid; revenge attacks would not be tolerated. Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, is increasingly depending on government-sponsored gangs and on shelling cities with heavy artillery rather than overrunning them with troops, prec

of the international community, along with the United States." If the Lieberman-Graham-Casey resolution guides US policy, says George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that would "preclude" fulfillment of the UN resolutions and isolate the US from the international coalition that backed t

ompensate Egypt for lost American military assistance. The Syrian crisis and the US administration's reluctant position towards acting against the Bashar Al-Assad regime came to add to the sources of difference, particularly after the Obama administration retreated from its threats to strike Al-Assad's regime

reats to strike Al-Assad's regime and engaged in a deal on Syrian EFTA00705807 chemical weapons, which gave another opportunity of survival to Al- Assad. The major source of the US-Saudi difference, however, came on Iran — particularly after the initial agreement on its nuclear programme, which Saud

iliation and courageous political and economic decisions that would allow Egypt to move beyond such dependence. Michele Dunne, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. EFTA00705814

ffective in Libya. Instead, it embraced an effort to arm the self-evidently ineffective and incoherent opposition in its doomed effort to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. The administration said Assad's fall was inevitable but refused to make it so. Thousands died as Washington fiddled; instability and violence spre

n effort to arm the self-evidently ineffective and incoherent opposition in its doomed effort to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. The administration said Assad's fall was inevitable but refused to make it so. Thousands died as Washington fiddled; instability and violence spread into Lebanon, Iraq and Jorda

by such people. EFTA00701622 I learned something about this matter when I had the pleasure this week in Washington, D.C. of being on a panel at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The session discussed a report on Arab youth produced by the institute that I direct at the American University of Beirut

oyed no such support. Mubarak's Egypt, Bashar al Assad's Syria, Jordan under the Hashemites and the Gul

anon's political mainstream. Hezbollah benefited from a strong patron in Iran. Hamas, on the other hand, enjoyed no such support. Mubarak's Egypt, Bashar al Assad's Syria, Jordan under the Hashemites and the Gulf monarchies under the influence of the House of Saud all shared a deep interest in keeping Hamas box

s. Nathan J. Brown is professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington Univeristy and nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. EFTA_R1_00464344 EFTA01977728 Article 2. Foreign Policy How Hamas Won the War Aaron David Miller November 19, 2012

autocrats foster instability and economic stagnation—=ot stability—in the Middle East. =/p> Syria: 2013 will be viewed as the yea= that President Bashar al-Assad turned the tide in the war in Syria. As Adam Entous and =iobhan Gorman detailed in a Wall Street Journal story this week, "all-in" military support

ria. As Adam Entous and =iobhan Gorman detailed in a Wall Street Journal story this week, "all-in" military support from Iran and Hezbollah allowed Assad to retake crucial territory. The Obama administration, however, blinked. Obama had vowed to punish Assad for any chemical weapons attacks. Yet the p

it only because we didn=92t give the "good guys" big enough guns? =br> As Muasher, a former Jordanian foreign=minister and now a vice president at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, put it in an interv=ew: 'Three years of the Arab uprising have shown the bankruptcy of all the ol= political forces in the Arab worl

n short, this is a dangerous regime -- dangerous to its people and, as the CW movement suggests, dangerous to the region. The time for talking with Bashar al-Assad has passed. It EFTA_R1_02209740 EFTA02723612 is time for ultimatums -- and, if those fail, armed action to topple the regime. Jeffrey White is

the region. The time for talking with Bashar al-Assad has passed. It EFTA_R1_02209740 EFTA02723612

between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood that for the foreseeable future they have to share power," says Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for EFTA_R1_02209747 EFTA02723619 International Peace. "They have to rule together because there is no other way to do it. They cannot start add

US continues to struggle with the decision whether to provide military support to the moderate faction of the Syrian rebels fighting to topple the Assad regime, the Saudis suggest that they see Syria as a defining moment — an opportunity to stop what they see as Iranian "meddling" in the region by r

l analyst at JTG Inc. in Vienna, Virginia. His writing has appeared in The New York Times, Foreign Policy, CNN, Al Monitor and has been featured by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Article 4 Atlantic Monthly No, President Obama Did Not Break the Middle East effrey Goldberg EFTA00665426 Jun 23 20