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n around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l
n program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025069 --- PAGE BREAK --- He
making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025056 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025057 →y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there’s no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in trai
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025057 →n around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than l
n program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028703 --- PAGE BREAK --- He i
making significant gains on the battlefield this week, following an offer by their top political leader for negotiations with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028690 --- PAGE BREAK --- This military and diplomatic news may appear positive. But Syrian sources caution that the battlefield a
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028691 →y, as Alawite supporters of the regime retreat to their ancestral homeland in the northwestern region around Latakia. And there's no sign that either Assad or his Russian patrons are paying any more than lip service to a political settlement. One potential game-changer is a request for U.S. help in train
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028691 →program, and now, as a result of November's interim agreement in Geneva, it does not even fear international economic sanctions. Neither the Bashar Assad regime nor Al Qaeda terrorists in Syria see any prospect of material U.S. intervention. And the main pressure being applied in the Israeli- Palestin
eapons program, and now, as a result of November's interim agreement in Geneva, it does not even fear international economic sanctions. Neither the Bashar Assad regime nor Al Qaeda terrorists in Syria see any prospect of material U.S. intervention. And the main pressure being applied in the Israeli- P
suggests that things are so bad Barack Obama has asked for "options." Three years into the war and the president wants a plan. In all probability, Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator, is not cowed by Obama threatening options. He continues to bomb his own people — barrel bombs, cluster bombs — and starve reca
Syria. These opposition groups are fighting the Assad regime, but recently turned on each other with increased ferocity. Jeffrey White, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former senior American intelligence official, said the Assad government was using Russian-supplied Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters to carry out th
people have died from starvation since last July; the inevitable outcome of a military blockade imposed on the camp by Syria's embattled President Bashar al-Assad. The purpose of the siege is to root out foreign Sunni jihadist militias, e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra, who now occupy the camp. These militants have set u
e camp, and have been able to recruit new fighters from within the vulnerable Palestinian population in order to further their goal of toppling the Assad regime. Rumors of people resorting to eating grass and stray cats and dogs while trying to avoid being killed by sniper fire or Assad's crude yet l
nderstanding, however, that his hosts will be looking for actions and not just good words may yet make them productive. Dennis Ross is counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and was a senior Middle East advisor to President Obama from 2009 to 2011. The National Interest Lebanon's Next Flashpoint Nicholas Saidel Marc
le, including by the repeated use of chemical weapons, and yet has remarkably culminated in the re- legitimization of the person responsible for it, Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian civil war— particularly the White House's inept and improvisational response to it—has accidentally transformed Putin into a major powe
military aid to moderate groups in the Syrian opposition, enough to raise their hopes but not enough to ensure success on the battlefield. And when Assad used chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods, Obama threatened military action — only to back off, again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. fact
en factions that wants Syrians to live under Sunni Muslim law. "They're Salafists but not extremists," explains Andrew J. Tabler, a Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. What that means is that although members of the front want a government dominated by devout Sunnis, and they probably aren't reliable pluralist de
hey sowed," Levitt writes in a January report for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Quds Force planners were stretched thin by the
ents, but when Washington offers a more passive response, Iranian aggression increases. With respect to Syria, for example, it cannot be assumed that Bashar al-Assad will fall at all, let alone quickly, without active U.S. engagement. If the Assad HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028655 --- PAGE BREAK --- regime does in fact sur
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028656 →Entities connected to both Bashar al-Assad and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Barack Obama
PERSON
George W. Bush
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Lebanon
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
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Tehran
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Bill Clinton
PERSON
Damascus
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Terje Rod-Larsen
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Hosni Mubarak
PERSON
Middle East
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Cairo
LOCATION
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Jeffrey Epstein
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Yemen
LOCATION
Marc Rich
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Vladimir Putin
PERSON
Jerusalem
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Donald Trump
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Fatah
ORGANIZATION