Epstein Secrets

In addition, various political figures and commentators have praised or come to the defense of despotic rulers including Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Bashar al-Assad. 6. Modem authoritarians can be expected to dou- ble down on their drive to neuter civil society as an incubator of reformist ideas and political

o defend embattled allies like Syria's 8ashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what migh

and persecution. They are frequent- ly jailed on trumped-up charges of defamation, tax fraud, or drug trafficking, among others. 12 EFTA00804736 Freedom House 2. Marginalizing the opposition: As noted above, authoritarian leaders use their media power to paint critics as knaves or buffoons. Especially t

East" there is that age-old instinct for reading the wind and riding with the victor. It had taken some five months for President Obama to call on Bashar al- Assad to relinquish power, but once that call was made we were reduced to mere spectators of the Syrian calamity. We exaggerated the might of th

nic ambitions of Iranian theocracy, and an Iraq in the orbit of U.S. power would have been less likely to cast its fate with the embattled House of Assad in Syria. For a year now, the people of Syria have been in the midst of a heroic struggle against a tyrannical regime, but no American help has com

as handing the Egyptian military the full $1.3 billion of its annual U.S. aid despite its blatant violations of human rights. Organizations such as Freedom House argued that the United States was breaking faith with the Americans and Egyptians facing criminal trial in Cairo this month for promoting democracy.

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs,

ther. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't g

places I experienced firsthand as an economic adviser. Bolivians enjoyed greater political and civil rights than the Vietnamese did, as measured by Freedom House, yet Bolivia's economy grew slowly whereas Vietnam's attracted foreign investment like a magnet. It is easy to see why: Bolivia is a landlocked mou

the Golan Heights, which could have tipped the balance of power with Israel. Rather, it only appealed to them for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is almost farcical. In the year 2000, Muammar Gaddafi wanted to declare a war on Israel, yet he had no q

em for immediate assistance to keep the Bashar al-Assad regime in power. In Libya, the situation is alm

tional Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, which are allied with the two main U.S. political parties, as well as from Freedom House and some European groups. Their crime was trying to teach Egypt's young democrats how to monitor elections and start parties to engage in the very

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs

her. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't

places I experienced firsthand as an economic adviser. Bolivians enjoyed greater political and civil rights than the Vietnamese did, as measured by Freedom House, yet Bolivia's economy grew slowly whereas Vietnam's attracted foreign investment like a magnet. It is easy to see why: Bolivia is a landlocked mo

led, but regressed as well. Reversals in civil liberties and political rights caused Jordan to lose significant international standing. In the annual Freedom House rankings, Jordan declined from a rank of 4 in 2001 (partly free) on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 being most free) to a rank of 6 (not free) in 2010. Corrupti

oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo

ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur

ns like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organization of American States, and to defend embattled allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what might be called authoritarian best practices, vividly on display in the new Chinese law on nongovernment

tions with other regional states. Turkey similarly claimed a policy of “zero problems” with its neighbors in the period before the Syrian civil war. Freedom House's Tyler Roylance has described a “common set of concessions" that 21st-century au- thoritarians made to the prevailing democratic ethos in the wake of