Epstein Secrets

oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo

ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur

regimes lying between the Atlas Mountains and the Persian Gulf. Yet unlike the Muslim Brotherhood's rebellion in Hama, which shook the government of Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez in 1982, the Facebook rebellion seems curiously faceless. There are some signs of opposition violence with "plausible reports of securit

Allahu Akbar (God Is Greater), often regarded as the jihadist war cry. At first sight the defection of more than three hundred members of the ruling Baath party in protest at the crackdown would suggest that Syria's one-party state, in place since 1963, is beginning to unravel. What some people are call

lims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect o

mid-March in Daraa, in southern Syria, a city that has suffered from drought and neglect by the government in Damascus. The heavy hand of the ruling Baath party was particularly resented. Because it lies on the border with Jordan, and therefore in a security zone, all land sales required the security se

A government spokeswoman has hinted that coming reforms will include greater freedom for the press and the right to form political parties. President Bashar al-Assad is due to address the country in the next 48 hours. His speech is eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to defuse the

llenged the fundamentals of Syria's security state, a harsh system of controls over every aspect of society, put in place by the late Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, who ruled for 30 years from 1970 to his death in 2000. By all accounts, the debate HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 --- PAGE BREAK --- 4 about how

emplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands

present evidence, a bloody stalemate that further destabilizes the region. It's distasteful to contemplate dialogue with leaders such as Gaddafi and Assad who, to put it bluntly, have blood on their hands. But this approach is worth exploring if it can foster a transition to a democratic government - wh

cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of their citizens to hang

ce is a powerful force in this part of the world. The Alawites understand that they face an existential crisis, and if they allow their grip over the Baath-dominated political system - and most importantly the military - to loosen even slightly, they will likely become the prime targets of a Sunni vendet