Epstein Secrets

ds with the Obama administration. Top Saudi officials were angered by a previous U.S. decision to cancel a planned strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, as well as what they perceived as Washington's hostile attitude toward the governments in Egypt and Bahrain. In response to these disagreem

eeblement, lest it re-emerge as the region's most EFTA00707114 powerful actor. They point to Tehran's support for Hizbollah and for the murderous Assad regime in Syria. The interests of almost everyone else are otherwise. Not to be tricked by smooth talking into making it easier for Iran to acquire

, which consists of many facilities, widely dispersed and well protected. The most critical one, nestled deep underground within a mountain, is the Fordow site, and its -three thousand-plus centrifuges have enabled Iran to spin out enriched uranium from uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to a level of 19.

ruiting supporters within the ranks of the still largely secular protest movement, whose unifying goal is the ouster of the regime led by President Bashar al-Assad. But if the United Nations' peace plan fails to end the government's bloody crackdown and promises of Western and Arab help for the rebel Free S

al. Although many Syrian opposition activists insist that their revolution is not sectarian, EFTA00660170 a majority of Syrians are Sunnis, while Assad, along with most leading figures in the regime and in the security forces, belongs to the Shiite- affiliated Alawite minority, lending a sectarian d

anium enrichment to 20 percent purity, which is near bomb-grade; (2) ship abroad the entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium; (3) close the Fordow enrichment facility, which is buried under a mountain near the clerical city of Qom; (4) allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agen

n talks in Geneva, fol=ows Tehran's willingness to go along with the Russian-initiated deal on =hemical weapons in Syria — where Iran is backing the Assad regime. The l=lamic Republic appears to be softening its longstanding policies in favour=of a more conciliatory approach. The shift is caused by the

military inte=vention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran i= required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be.acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water r=actor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of this kind

r would be quite large. If a military operation would leave the Arak =eactor intact and only focus on the three other critical facilities in Nat=nz, Fordow and Isfahan, Iran could use the reactor for producing material =or a nuclear bomb in the aftermath of the attack. In practice, this means =hat if a

said to be American-supplied. This humiliating defeat shows the rise of the Islamist rebels, most of whom oppose political dialogue with President Bashar al-Assad's regime and call for the establishment of a Qur'anic-based state. It also demonstrates the near-collapse of the FSA, which the west had hoped would

s no military solution for Syria, although that may be self-evident, I do not believe that every player in this game believes that. Does President Assad believe that? President Assad believes that at the end of the day you need a political solution. But I believe that those who are pushing for a U.S

are various ways of making sure that this reactor will remain exclusively peaceful." Asked about a U.S. demand to close the enrichment facility at Fordow, built into a mountainside, Zarif said: "If you sit in Iran, and you see people having concerns about Fordow, the only conclusion you can draw is t

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs,

ther. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't g

tiated outcome is far more desirable, and then state that any acceptable negotiated deal must require immediate closing the underground facility at Fordow, freezing of all enrichment above five percent and exporting of all of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched above that level, and imposing intrusiv

cyber and covert war have had some effect, and the unraveling situation in Syria -- where Iran has remained a stalwart ally of embattled President Bashar al-Assad -- has isolated Tehran even further. Meanwhile, the Israelis can keep the world focused on their agenda and on the edge of their collective chairs

her. At the same time, Iran is committed to at the very least developing the capacity to weaponize, should it decide to do so. And the fall of the Assads, when it comes, may only add to Tehran's fear of Sunni encirclement and accelerate its drive for the ultimate weapon. None of this means it ain't

tiated outcome is far more desirable, and then state that any acceptable negotiated deal must require immediate closing the underground facility at Fordow, freezing of all enrichment above five percent and exporting of all of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched above that level, and imposing intrusi

seen in other North African states, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. I think it is likely to happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see how his regime will remain long in power. TB: Should the United States get involved there? DP: No

weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its actual goal. Iran has refused, sayi

happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see

o weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its actual goal. Iran has refused, saying

IGHT_028748 --- PAGE BREAK --- states, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. I think it is likely to happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad's power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see how his regime will remain long in power. TB: Should the United States get involved there? DP: No, A

o weapons-grade material -- transfer its existing stock of such fuel to a third country, and shut down one of its two enrichment facilities, known as Fordow. In exchange, the parties will help Iran produce such fuel for medical purposes, which the regime claims is its actual goal. Iran has refused, saying

HT_027122 --- PAGE BREAK --- states, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. I think it is likely to happen before too long. TB: What about Syria? DP: Assad’s power is steadily diminishing and I cannot see how his regime will remain long in power. TB: Should the United States get involved there? DP: No,