Epstein Secrets

ds with the Obama administration. Top Saudi officials were angered by a previous U.S. decision to cancel a planned strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime, as well as what they perceived as Washington's hostile attitude toward the governments in Egypt and Bahrain. In response to these disagreem

eeblement, lest it re-emerge as the region's most EFTA00707114 powerful actor. They point to Tehran's support for Hizbollah and for the murderous Assad regime in Syria. The interests of almost everyone else are otherwise. Not to be tricked by smooth talking into making it easier for Iran to acquire

p [Iran], to stop its ability to project influence in the region. And I think they've drawn the line in Syria," said Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. "Sometimes they say, `if we don't do it in Syria, the next time it will be on our own territory.'" The threat of

le, including by the repeated use of chemical weapons, and yet has remarkably culminated in the re- legitimization of the person responsible for it, Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian civil war— particularly the White House's inept and improvisational response to it—has accidentally transformed Putin into a major powe

military aid to moderate groups in the Syrian opposition, enough to raise their hopes but not enough to ensure success on the battlefield. And when Assad used chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods, Obama threatened military action — only to back off, again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. fact

only on Iran, but also on Syria and the Palestinian question — seriously diminish American influence in the region. Bernard Haykel is Professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. Daniel Kurtzer, a former United States ambassador to Israel and Egypt, is a visiting professor of Middle East poli

cal life and for that of the regime put in place in 1970 by his father, the late President Hafez al-Assad. Forty-one years in power The rule of the Assads, father and son, has now lasted 41 years, a score comparable to that of other long-lasting Arab autocrats, each apparently determined to be a préside

Arab autocrats, each apparently determined to be a président-a-vie. In no other part of the world have so many rulers clung so assiduously to power. Bashar appears genuinely to have believed that the Arab nationalist ideology he inherited, his opposition to Israel and his support for resistance movements

tly financed a London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m between 2005 and 2010. A continuous whole It is probably fair to view Bashar al-Assad’s term of office and that of his father as a single continuous whole. Not only did Hafez al-Assad decide that Bashar should succeed him, but he also be

ry for management. Received wisdom gets eviscerated. “Jeff, you’ve got to do better than that,” she told Jeffrey Feltman, the assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, one day when he presented a shopworn idea. With USAID undergoing an overhaul, she listens to every reform report, down to the details of how