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with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late
y furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war --
e, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil w
untries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially r=cognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage poin
to be given=to the day after a strike on Iran to avoid its downsides or plan for its consequences. Marwan Muasher is vice president fo= studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously =erved as foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan. Article 8. Prospect</=> Michael Sandel and AC Gray=ing in conversa
n, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in
ose allies. Henri Barkey is a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor of international relations at Leh
a key position in the region. What happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in Hama, Homs and Latakia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, t
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025011 →feat in a subsequent round of fighting in 2006. In a poll of Arab public opinion taken in 2008, the three most popular leaders were Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in that order. But this sense of inexorable ascendancy in which the Iran-led bloc liked to cloak itself has fallen victim to
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_025020 →lims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect o
A government spokeswoman has hinted that coming reforms will include greater freedom for the press and the right to form political parties. President Bashar al-Assad is due to address the country in the next 48 hours. His speech is eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to defuse the
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 →llenged the fundamentals of Syria's security state, a harsh system of controls over every aspect of society, put in place by the late Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, who ruled for 30 years from 1970 to his death in 2000. By all accounts, the debate HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 --- PAGE BREAK --- 4 about how
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 →es been far from neutral, favoring one community over another in cynical power plays. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percen
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030035 →13 May, 2011 Article 1. NYT The Tony Awards Roger Cohen Article 2. Project Syndicate Democracy's Dawn in Tunisia and Egypt? Alfred Stepan Article 3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan (Summary + Conclusion) Marwan Muasher Article 4. Foreign Policy Syria: Too Big to Fail? Aaron David M
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030060 →oratory, you couldn't have done much better. Syria presents a profoundly different situation. U.S. policy has always been driven by the hope that the Assads would change and the fear of what might replace them if they fell. Three additional realities ensured a U.S. response quite different from the one fo
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030074 →ng different. There simply is no reform option, and there never was. Genuine reform means dislodging the bricks holding up Assad- Makhlouf authority. Bashar Assad's open-ended presidency, the crony capitalism practiced by his cousin and other members of Syria's elite, the abuse practiced by the all-powerful secur
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030079 →FH_Authoritarians_Report_2017.indd
ns like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organization of American States, and to defend embattled allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what might be called authoritarian best practices, vividly on display in the new Chinese law on nongovernment
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019237 →cations for U.S. Policy.” Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraines Democratic Breakthrough (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 9. “Briefing on Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Russia,” Human Rights Watch, February 24, 2017, https:/Awww.hrw.org/ news/2017/02/24/br
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019262 →Entities connected to both Bashar al-Assad and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Barack Obama
PERSON
George W. Bush
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Lebanon
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Tehran
LOCATION
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Damascus
LOCATION
Hosni Mubarak
PERSON
Middle East
LOCATION
Tunisia
LOCATION
Cairo
LOCATION
Yemen
LOCATION
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Marc Rich
PERSON
Hillary Clinton
PERSON
Vladimir Putin
PERSON
Jerusalem
LOCATION
Donald Trump
PERSON