Epstein Secrets

3 only drama playing out there. Syria is also a highly tribalized and sectarian-divided country. Its Shiite-leaning Alawite minority — led by the Assads and comprising 12 percent of the population — dominates the government, army and security services. Sunni-Muslim Syrian Arabs are 75 percent, Chris

n ever. The regional balance of power is shifting against Tehran, in no small part because of its ongoing support for the beleaguered government of Bashar al- Assad in Syria. The Assad regime is failing, and in time, Iran will lose its only state ally in the Arab world and its conduit for arming the m

an continued its support for the Assad regime and backed his brutal crackdown on civilians. The Syrian uprising has become a zero-sum game: Either Bashar al-Assad will win, or the demonstrators will triumph. Likewise, it has become a proxy war between Tehran and Ankara, in which there will be only one winner.

ons to deal with. That has been a fundamental premise throughout the Soviet /Russian existence. Can you give a recent example? Yes. In the case of Chechnya, the Russians were extremely nervous during the initial phases of that war [1994-1996] that there'd be some sort of UN resolution that argued for a

s and even critical discussions are limited. Russia, Iran, and China remain supportive. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states tried last year to detach Bashar al-Assad from his ties to Iran, EFTA00712622 but without success. In this effort, they tipped their hand in supporting autocracy over democracy in the reg

tor in 2007. And it has close links to the Iranian regime, which is the No. 1 enemy of the U.S. and its allies in the region. Moreover, the longer Assad stays in power without being able to stop the uprising against his government — which is now more than a year old — the greater the odds that region

re is an important step the United States can take to change Israel's calculations -- helping the people of Syria in their battle against President Bashar al-Assad's regime. Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem unconnected, but in fact they are inextricably linked. Israel's real fear -- losing i

t organization with unseen but munificent benefactors, probably in Saudi Arabia. They have long acted as recruitment networks for causes in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan during the Soviet war (1979-89). Today they have ties to the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, who in turn have ties to Iraqi refugees in

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ > Subject: June 9 update Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 14:35:09 +0000 9 June, 2012 Article 1. NYT Assad, the Butcher Editorial Article 2. The Washington Post syrian intervention is justifiable, na d'List Anne-Marie Slaughter Article 3. Bloomberg

helicopter gunships since the anti-Assad protests began 16 months ago. Despite his claims that the violence is the work of "terrorists," President Bashar al-Assad has a lot to hide. On Thursday, Syrian troops and pro- government supporters barred the monitors from Qubeir, and the monitors were fired upon. The

pular demonstrations by any means it chooses, including the kinds of crimes against humanity, indeed near-genocide, that Vladimir Putin ordered in Chechnya at the turn of the century. Kissinger claimed that the Russian and Chinese governments are upholding the foundations of a world order that the Unit

In addition, various political figures and commentators have praised or come to the defense of despotic rulers including Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Bashar al-Assad. 6. Modem authoritarians can be expected to dou- ble down on their drive to neuter civil society as an incubator of reformist ideas and political

o defend embattled allies like Syria's 8ashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what migh

same hymnal, and most influential outlets reflected a variety of opinions about government policies, including the Kremlin's conduct of the war in Chechnya. Putin moved quickly to change these conditions. He reorganized and exerted tighter political con- trol over state-owned television stations, broug

le, including by the repeated use of chemical weapons, and yet has remarkably culminated in the re- legitimization of the person responsible for it, Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian civil war— particularly the White House's inept and improvisational response to it—has accidentally transformed Putin into a major powe

military aid to moderate groups in the Syrian opposition, enough to raise their hopes but not enough to ensure success on the battlefield. And when Assad used chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods, Obama threatened military action — only to back off, again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. fact

nemies. In 2004, Russian secret agents assassinated Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a warlord and vice president of the EFTA00706395 breakaway republic of Chechnya, as he ferried his 13-year-old son down the streets of Doha and away from the mosque where they had just participated in Friday prayers. An intense

W. Bush's expansive doctrine, promoting freedom. Senator John McCain, demanding American air strikes to help rebels topple the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, adopts the Bush "freedom agenda" rationale: by halting suffering and helping overthrow tyranny, we earn some leverage with the victors, improving

cs who would not hesitate to use them. Syria, says Nagl, is another good place to think hard about collateral chaos: "The hard part is not toppling Assad, it's what comes afterwards. Everybody raise your hands if you're up for another occupation of an Islamic country." My first caveat is public opin

strongmen. Less than 10 years before he ordered the 2008 invasion of Georgia in order to "protect" the separatist South Ossetians, he "solved" the Chechnya problem by ordering the scorched-earth obliteration of its capital, Grozny, where more civilians were killed than at Sreberniza and Homs combined.

. Bush's expansive doctrine, promoting freedom. Senator John McCain, demanding American air strikes to help rebels topple the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, adopts the Bush "freedom agenda" rationale: by halting suffering and helping overthrow tyranny, we earn some leverage with the victors, improving

cs who would not hesitate to use them. Syria, says Nagl, is another good place to think hard about collateral chaos: "The hard part is not toppling Assad, it's what comes afterwards. Everybody raise your hands if you're up for another occupation of an Islamic country." My first caveat is public opin

strongmen. Less than 10 years before he ordered the 2008 invasion of Georgia in order to "protect" the separatist South Ossetians, he "solved" the Chechnya problem by ordering the scorched-earth obliteration of its capital, Grozny, where more civilians were killed than at Sreberniza and Horns combined

e moral bankruptcy of its foreign policy, has reaped a harvest of consistency and single-mindedness. It has entirely and unwaveringly supported the Bashar Al-Assad regime, used its status as a permanent United Nations Security Council member to veto any opposing resolution, and has provided superior weaponry t

onal feebleness in response to the Iranian nuclear program. But the takeaway message on Syria is that in all of the circumstances, awful though the Assads were and disreputable and unacceptably motivated though their Iranian and Russian sponsors are, it is not clear that an objectively preferable alte

, because chaos in Afghanistan would threaten all of them. Moscow still sees extremism in Afghanistan as a threat to Muslim regions of Russia like Chechnya, and to the Muslim-populated former Soviet republics of Central Asia. China similarly worries that upheaval in Afghanistan could exacerbate Islamic

lims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect o

A government spokeswoman has hinted that coming reforms will include greater freedom for the press and the right to form political parties. President Bashar al-Assad is due to address the country in the next 48 hours. His speech is eagerly awaited, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to defuse the

llenged the fundamentals of Syria's security state, a harsh system of controls over every aspect of society, put in place by the late Hafez al-Assad, Bashar's father, who ruled for 30 years from 1970 to his death in 2000. By all accounts, the debate HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030032 --- PAGE BREAK --- 4 about how

es been far from neutral, favoring one community over another in cynical power plays. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percen

ns like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Organization of American States, and to defend embattled allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. There is also growing replica- tion of what might be called authoritarian best practices, vividly on display in the new Chinese law on nongovernment

he same hymnal, and most influential outlets reflected a variety of opinions about government policies, including the Kremlin's conduct of the war in Chechnya. Putin moved quickly to change these conditions. He reorganized and exerted tighter political con- trol over state-owned television stations, brough