Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

I Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley I Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman I Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty AdvisorS, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question an