Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

jury. There, unlike here, the attorney properly appeared to testify and then asserted a claim of privilege in response to particular questions. The Seventh Circuit found that the following questions did not call for privileged communications: (1) Whom did you direct [in the search of documents responsive to the

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

jury. There, unlike here, the attorney properly appeared to testify and then asserted a claim of privilege in response to particular questions. The Seventh Circuit found that the following questions did not call for privileged communications: (1) Whom did you direct [in the search of documents responsive to the

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

2001) (information regarding the receipt of attorney's fees is not protected). In Matter of Grand Jury Proceeding, 68 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit discussed specific questions asked of an attorney during his testimony before the grand jury. There, unlike here, the attorney properly appeared to