Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes ofDoe, production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating. Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei