Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

80); United States v. Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

980); United States I Landof, , 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand flay Proceedings , 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn , the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd , the court found tha

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

. 1980); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 651 (M.D. Fl. 1977)). In Blackburn, the Middle District of Florida applied the act of production privilege under the premise that Boyd was still binding precedent. Even applying Boyd, the court found that