Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

would effectively insulate discoverable acts merely because they were enacted in the presence of an attorney.") (emphasis added). Just a month ago, the Second Circuit addressed this issue when a defendant tried to disqualify prosecutors who had seen four documents that the defense alleged were privileged. United

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

would effectively insulate discoverable acts merely because they were enacted in the presence of an attorney.") (emphasis added). Just a month ago, the Second Circuit addressed this issue when a defendant tried to disqualify prosecutors who had seen four documents that the defense alleged were privileged. United

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

ould effectively insulate discoverable acts merely because they were enacted in the presence of an attorney.") (emphasis added). Just a month ago, the Second Circuit addressed this issue when a defendant tried to disqualify prosecutors who had seen four documents that the defense alleged were privileged. -19- EF

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted'!’—a holding clearl

t grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime.”” (quoting In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). '3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664

stead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give

"the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005))). (quoting Jn re 3 Of course, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution as part of his sentence until he has been found guilty. See /

bstantive discussion of whether CVRA rights apply in criminal cases before the filing of charges. Instead, the courts simply cited to language from a Second Circuit decision that stated that the CVRA does not give victims any rights against defendants until those defendants have been convicted !!* - a holding cle

United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ™ See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172-73 (2001). 75 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). 76 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191,