Epstein Secrets

d-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 189 EFTA00100156 the court and defense counsel that it recogn

32,145(2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United States v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00100167 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

d-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 189 EFTA00077821 the court and defense counsel that it recogn

, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United States v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00077832 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

d-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 189 EFTA00039636 the court and defense counsel that it recogn

, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United States v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00039647 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury

, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United States v. Thompson, 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa).

d-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complie

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selecting the jury from t

that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahia again illustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the retrial "to accommodate trial congestion in the court's calendar during a period of judicial emergency . . . ." United States v. Soares, 66

d-faith representation to the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 189 EFTA00103214 the court and defense counsel that it recogn

, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United States v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa)

trials held in Brooklyn were drawn from the entire Eastern District, while jurors for trials held in the "Long Island Division," which included the Uniondale 200 EFTA00103225 courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that the district court erred by selec

nvolve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury