Epstein Secrets

(internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) (accounting

18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit has recently refused to extend the act of product

production of a personal calendar “would require mere surrender of the calendar, and not testimony” (internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) (accounting records not subject to act of production protection; in producing records the defendant would not

formation by conceding that he in fact has the documents.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit has recently refused to extend the act of production doctrine on facts very similar to those here. In United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313 (D.C. Ci

ptions should be "narrowly construed." Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16 (citing United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926)); see also Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) ("we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision," particularly when

entails" the identified conduct can it be said to be an "offense involving" that conduct. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484. In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), a venue statute that applies to "[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails, transportati

149—50 n.29. 47 S. Ct. 21, because we must consider the constitutional issues whether or not they apply to the specific facts of Ms. Wilds case, ()Clark. 543 U.S. at 380. 125 S. Ct. at 724. This is not some groundbreaking method of statutory interpretation—it is simply the canon of constitutional avo

lear and sensible boundary' that is marked by the formal initiation of criminal proceedings and that Chief Judge Srinivasan astutely recognized for the D.C. Circuit in Fokker Services. There is a world of difference between a court insinuating itself into a prosecutor's case before charges are filed and steppin

relevant to the employment relationship. Thus, as the D.C. Circuit has observed, ‘‘an employer’s right to silence is

d)); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989) (“The running of such statutes is traditionally subject to equitable tolling.’’); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967); Glus v. Brooklyn E.D. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959) (equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is “[d]eeply roo