Epstein Secrets

hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part

ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part

ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part

ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part

ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part

ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90