Epstein Secrets

6-CV-2242 (VEC), 2020 WL 1503452, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03 (2019)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "the district court should not admit testimony that is 'directed solely to lay matters which a ju

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex

0,21,22,31 United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001) 29 United States v. Moore, 798 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) 27, 28 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) 12, 19 United States v. Mustaga, 753 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) 15 United States v. Randall, No. 19 C

mony is simply an attempt to invade the province of the jury by putting a thumb on the scale in their assessment of witness credibility.6 See, e.g., Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398 ("[E]xpert opinions that constitute evaluations of witness credibility, even when such evaluations are rooted in scientific or tec

6-CV-2242 (VEC), 2020 WL 1503452, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03 (2019)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "the district court should not admit testimony that is 'directed solely to lay matters which a ju

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex

6-CV-2242 (VEC), 2020 WL 1503452, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03 (2019)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "the district court should not admit testimony that is 'directed solely to lay matters which a ju

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex

259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Daubers, 509 U.S. at 593-94). But Rule 702 ultimately sets a "liberal" and "permissive" standard of admissibility. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2005). In particular, not every expert admissible under Daubers need rely on a method that confor

6-CV-2242 (VEC), 2020 WL 1503452, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.03 (2019)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that "the district court should not admit testimony that is 'directed solely to lay matters which a ju