t v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)). But Rule 702 ultimately sets a "liberal" and "permissive" standard of admissibility. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2005). In particular, not every expert admissible under Daubert need rely on a method that confor

259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Daubers, 509 U.S. at 593-94). But Rule 702 ultimately sets a "liberal" and "permissive" standard of admissibility. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2005). In particular, not every expert admissible under Daubers need rely on a method that confor

roposed expert testimony is reliable, and (3) the proposed testimony is relevant. See Dauber! v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 n.11 (2d Cir. 2005). "Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, e

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex

mony is simply an attempt to invade the province of the jury by putting a thumb on the scale in their assessment of witness credibility.6 See, e.g., Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398 ("[E]xpert opinions that constitute evaluations of witness credibility, even when such evaluations are rooted in scientific or tec

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex

is inadmissible if it "comment[s] directly, under the guise of expert opinion, on the credibility of trial testimony from" specific fact witnesses. Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398. Additionally, if the expert's "opinion is one that the jury could reach with their own `common knowledge and common sense,' no ex