Epstein Secrets

its silence is controlling." Delgadq_v. United States Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS. 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

its silence is controlling." Delgadq_v. United States Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS. 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

its silence is controlling." Delgadq_v. United States Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS. 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

its silence is controlling." Delgadq_v. United States Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS. 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the

its silence is controlling." Delgadq_v. United States Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS. 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206 F.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted). Because the statute provides a single cause of action with a single

time of the underlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) ("Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the