Epstein Secrets

guage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Mingio,209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00100120 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht,No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00077785 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00039600 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00103178 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

nding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge." United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.