Epstein Secrets

guage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Mingio,209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00100120 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00077785 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00039600 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

guage of the statute charged,' her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 152 EFTA00095244 First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of

dictment referred to victims by pseudonyms, is particularly instructive here. See id. at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

uage of the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See

pseudonyms, 153 EFTA00103178 is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer's holding "that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the c

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable