Epstein Secrets

equest for injunctive relief, each request fails. With respect to Petitioners request for a letter of apology, such a remedy is not cognizable. In Woodruff v. Oilman, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that the district court exceeded its equitable powers when it ordered a par

t may contravene the beliefs the defendant holds. See id.; see also Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08474, 2008 WL 2682606, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Woodruff 29 F. App'x at 346) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize."). Petitioners request that t

ent scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" - not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93,110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory right

rnment, such a claim fails to state a claim as a matter of law. See Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 WL 2682606, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Woodruff v. Ohnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")

hnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")). In Woodruff, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its prior holding that courts "are not commissioned to run around getting apologies" and reasoned that the law is not u

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ

rnment, such a claim fails to state a claim as a matter of law. See Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 WL 2682606, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Woodruff v. Ohnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")

hnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")). In Woodruff, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its prior holding that courts "are not commissioned to run around getting apologies" and reasoned that the law is not u

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ

rnment, such a claim fails to state a claim as a matter of law. See Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 WL 2682606, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Woodruff v. Ohnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")

hnian, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Here, the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.")). In Woodruff, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its prior holding that courts "are not commissioned to run around getting apologies" and reasoned that the law is not u

ment scheme is based on the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" — not a civil complaint or a civil lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 693 F. Supp. 2d 93, 110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory righ