Epstein Secrets

rsations and/or improvisa- tions with Maryann Amacher, John Amuedo, Betty Dexter, Harlan Ellison, Edward Fredkin, Bernard Greenberg, Danny Hillis, Douglas Hofstadter, William Komfeld, Andor Kovach, David Levitt, Tod Machover, Charlotte Minsky, Curt Roads, Gloria Rudisch, Frederic Rzewski, and Stephen Smoliar.

Marvin Minsky Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 Why Do We Like Music? Why do we like mus

mes before anything larger or more complex is presented. No one remembers word for word all that is said in a lecture or all notes that are played Minsky 29 EFTA00284090 Fig. 1. Introductory mea- sures of Ludwig van Beethoven's Symphony No. 5 in C Minor. Flutes Mote Clarinets in Bb Broca Fla

. for instance, in the 19th-century philosophy of Charles Peirce IPei:341, in the writings of contempo- rary philosophers Daniel Dennett [Den91J and Douglas Hofstadter 1110179, I lo1961, in Benjamin Whorl's tj linguistic philosophy and Gregory Bateson's lam 79] systems theory of mind and nature. Bateson spoke of

r vast diversity, not from any single, perfect principle." This perspective was extended in the more recent work The Emotion Machine IMM071, where Minsky argued that emotions are "ways to think" evolved to handle different "problem types" that exist in the world. The brain is posited to have rule-base

nt, for instance, in the 19th-century philosophy of Charles Peirce [Pei34], in the writings of contempo- rary philosophers Daniel Dennett [Den91] and Douglas Hofstadter [Hof79, Hof96], in Benjamin Whorf’s [Who64] linguistic philosophy and Gregory Bateson’s [Bat79] systems theory of mind and nature. Bateson spoke of t

ur vast diversity, not from any single, perfect principle.” This perspective was extended in the more recent work The Emotion Machine [Min07], where Minsky argued that emotions are “ways to think” evolved to handle different “problem types” that exist in the world. The brain is posited to have rule-based

robot movement, may be supplied with a knob that can take on values corresponding to multiple possible movements. Following a metaphor suggested by Douglas Hofstadter MOSES learning covers both "knob twiddling" (setting the values of knobs) and "knob creation." MOSES is invoked within CogPrime in a number of way

ly specific theories of intelligence, and hence have attracted only moderate interest from researchers not adhering to these theories. An example is Minsky's work presented in The Emotion Machine IM MOM which arguably does constitute an architecture diagram for the human mind, but which is only loosely

r robot movement, may be supplied with a knob that can take on values corresponding to multiple possible movements. Following a metaphor suggested by Douglas Hofstadter [Hof96], MOSES learning covers both “knob twiddling” (setting the values of knobs) and “knob creation.” MOSES is invoked within CogPrime in a number

hly specific theories of intelligence, and hence have attracted only moderate interest from researchers not adhering to those theories. An example is Minsky’s work presented in The Emotion Machine [Min07], which arguably does constitute an architecture diagram for the human mind, but which is only loosely