Epstein Secrets

tational resources. And as we have argued in detail in Chapter 7, efficiency is not a side-issue but rather the essence of real-world AGI (since as Hutter has shown, if one casts efficiency aside, arbitrary levels of general intelligence can be achieved via a trivially simple program). The essence of

nce with respect to the distribution v over the space of all computable reward-summable environ- ments, E, that is, TOO a L v(Ii)1'; PEE Legg and Hutter's universal intelligence is obtained by setting v equal to the universal distribution. This framework is more flexible than it might seem. E.g. sup

lready encompassed by Legg and Hutter's definition because one may bias the distribution of environments within the latter by considering different Turing machines underlying the Kohnogorov complexity. However this is not a general equivalence because the Solomonoff-Levin measure intrinsically EFTA006

formance with respect to the distribution v over the space of all computable reward-summable environ- ments, E, that is, Y(m) = SO vr pew Legg and Hutter’s universal intelligence is obtained by setting v equal to the universal distribution. This framework is more flexible than it might seem. E.g. supp

putational resources. And as we have argued in detail in Chapter 7, efficiency is not a side-issue but rather the essence of real-world AGI (since as Hutter has shown, if one casts efficiency aside, arbitrary levels of general intelligence can be achieved via a trivially simple program). The essence of t

already encompassed by Legg and Hutter’s definition because one may bias the distribution of environments within the latter by considering different Turing machines underlying the Kolmogorov complexity. However this is not a general equivalence because the Solomonoff-Levin measure intrinsically HOUSE_OV

rization of Real-World General Intelligence ......... 135 7.3.1 Biased Universal Intelligence............ 0.00. ee eee 136 7.3.2 Connecting Legg and Hutter’s Model of Intelligent Agents to the Real World... ee cet ete e tne e eens 137 7.3.3 Pragmatic General Intelligence ............ 00... c eee eee 13

take c to denote algorithmic information measured on some reference Turing machine, and F(X) to denote what appears on the second tape of a two-tape Turing machine ¢ time-steps after placing X on its first tape. Other more naturalistic computational models are also possible here and are discussed extensi