Epstein Secrets

ecent years, and civilian policy tools—not having demonstrated comparable potency since perhaps the 1995 Dayton Agreement that ended hostilities in Bosnia—have lost stature and credibility compared to the military. Congressional funding has reflected the belief that DoD, alone among cabinet department

in power. Having no other major clients for its arms-export industry since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi, no other port of access for its navy in the Levant, and an affinity for a secular regime—however brutal—that bills itself as a bulwark against Sunni Arab religious extremism, Russia has deftly kept

ith the Russian plan to thwart concerted action against the Syrian atrocities; and Annan is playing in Syria the despicable role that he played in Bosnia, which is to run suave interference for EFTA_R 1_02205158 EFTA02721238 murderers. TIME. A few weeks ago I ran into a friend, a good man, who wo

he "Shia arc." Jordan and Egypt were natural fits. These predominantly Sunni countries were equally concerned with rising Iranian influence in the Levant and were determined to counter what they perceived as Tehran's outsized influence in the region. Yet Riyadh went a step further and aimed to also

ization and President George W. Bush's doctrine of preemption are two sides of the same coin. This latter school of thought gave Americans Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo during the 1990s and Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s. While the nation's military took an "acquisition holiday" during the 1990s, the

ping into the EFTA00712951 disillusionment and disorder of transitions. A new Salafi Crescent, radiating from the Persian Gulf sheikdoms into the Levant and North Africa, is one of the most underappreciated and disturbing byproducts of the Arab revolts. In varying degrees, these populist puritans ar