Epstein Secrets

wn up with help from US, British, Canadian and United Nations experts to "incorporate lessons and best practices from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia". THE REBELS Some analysts believe there are sufficient "losers" and weapons in post-Gaddafi Libya to stand an insurgency. This could become more

on-type killings by both sides in recent days, the rebels will also need to be held to their promise that there will be no revenge campaigns against Gaddafi loyalists. Again, Baghdad memories send a chill down the spine: the Iraqi Interior Ministry was used as a cover for Shiite death squads that liquid

world's ninth-largest oil reserves. It is hard not to share in the euphoria, especially in the Arab street, kindled by this week's fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. But world leaders would do well to proceed more cautiously than they did in the Afghanistan and Iraq ventures, despite the infectious excitement of

f relations among brothers claiming the Ottoman throne. In the meantime, Israel has cultivated closer ties with Balkan countries such as Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Greece. It has also put in more effort to strengthen ties with Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, India and China. And sittin

rorists if the regime collapses. EFTA_R1_00230154 EFTA01842830 In some respects, the potential worst-case scenario is more like Libya, where the Muammar Gaddafi regime lost control of mustard gas supplies and huge stockpiles of modern weapons. While the mustard gas, stored in bulk containers, reportedly wa

Syrian armed forces, which have remained relatively intact, unlike in Libya. Moreover, the Assad regime has more foreign allies than the isolated Gaddafi regime. It can rely on Moscow to block U.N. efforts and Iran and Hezbollah to help it resist a foreign intervention. Such differences would make a

ing Point That scenario no longer looks as unlikely as it once did. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton has already talked about Obama reaching his Bosnia moment. The U.S. election is mainly about jobs and the economy, but there is only so much passivity that a White House incumbent can afford when fa

n relatively optimistic economic prospects. Kissinger is right that in the end NATO's operations in Libya looked like an effort to remove Moammar Gaddafi from office, not because NATO planes took out command-and- control facilities in Tripoli from which Gaddafi and his generals were ordering civilian

celebrated desert libraries. Their mosques and shrines are what the al Qaeda-related militia Ansar al Dine are busy trying to destroy. Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo had prospered under the Ottoman dispensation of tolerance among faiths, trade with the West, and aesthetic heterogeneity. Their ancestor

e human rights violations in Arab countries and Iran. But then follow less justifiable motives. The war in Libya, for all the indignation over the Gaddafi regime's outrages, was a classical "small victorious war," at least for Paris and London at the time. However, the stake on it did not work. EFTA00

e reality of what has happened to other multiethnic societies when authoritarian regimes have collapsed does not provide a comforting track record. Bosnia today has made little progress in overcoming its divisions, despite billions of dollars in aid and massive Western state-building efforts followin

ed to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 that shap

e reality of what has happened to other multiethnic societies when authoritarian regimes have collapsed does not provide a comforting track record. Bosnia today has made little progress in overcoming its divisions, despite billions of dollars in aid and massive Western state-building efforts followin

d to meet the demands of its people for far reaching reforms. Arguably, the same reversal of outlook in Ankara occurred in relation to Libya after Muammar Gaddafi threatened to massacre his opposition, leading even to extending some Turkish support to the UN- EFTA_R1_00228271 EFTA01841735 backed NATO interv

ain branches of Al Hara- main have since been designated. See Exec. Order No. 18224 (designating BIF (November 19, 2002) and branches of Al Haramain (Bosnia, Somalia on March 11, 2002; Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanza- nia on January 22, 2004; Afghanistan, Al- bania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the Nether- lan

vived a motion to dismiss by the individual defendants. The court found it had subject matter ju- risdiction over seven Libyan officials, in- cluding Muammar Qadhafi, pursuant to the state sponsor of terrorism exception of the FSIA outlined in § 1605(a)(7). Pugh, 290 F.Supp.2d at 58. In its personal juris- diction

se. Just a few weeks ago, that would have seemed a surprising conclusion. Supporters of "liberal interventionism" hailed the decision to bomb Colonel Gaddafi's forces in Libya as evidence of a longed-for new era, in which dictators can no longer feel free to massacre their own people. However a western fai

wandan genocide of 1994 and over the many years of dithering as lives were lost in the Balkans. But a series of apparently successful interventions - Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone - gradually strengthened the belief that western military power could be used to end conflicts and save civilians.