Epstein Secrets

ust of Iran that stemmed from the 1979 hostage-taking had hardened into a one- dimensional view of the Islamic Republic as wholly malign. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and vicious rants against the existence of Israel confirmed Americans' worst fears. On the Iranian side, the list of real and perc

earchers came across a WikiLeaks cable that brilliantly foreshadowed how environmental stresses would fuel the uprising. Sent on Nov. 8, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus to the State Department, the cable details how, in light of what was a devastating Syrian drought — it lasted from 2006-10 — Syria's U.

adlines in the past by announcing that American troops should stay in Iraq until 2020, seemed to be hedging his bets. He met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the trip, as well as with top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Critics say the White House had a chance to curb Iranian influence bu

in the line of fire once the troops withdraw. Last month the fiery cleric Moqtada al-Sadr issued a blunt statement about American staff working at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad after the Dec. 31 deadline. "All of them are occupiers, and it is a must to fight them after the deadline," Sadr wrote. That is no idle

mber of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to 2005, Mousavian was later arrested and tried for espionage by the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Today, Mousavian is a research scholar at Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. Everyone recalls that regime change was

n "the families of those who died or were wounded." Of course the United States was not acting in a political vacuum. The November 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Islamist student and militants and the holding of 52 Americans as hostages for 444 days has permanently remained as a symbol of the r

m, typically used to refer to the Supreme Leader] basically decided that we would not have negotiations with America." He also portrayed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as ignorant and naive about the nuclear issue, and implied that Iran had missed opportunities to resolve the nuclear crisis with Washington and it

ant that the USSC was constrained by not one, but two, local "chief of mission" authorities in the field -- the Consulate General in Jerusalem and the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, whose own relations were fraught with petty intrigues and turf battles. The Dayton mission was further hobbled by the diplomatic mis

ust of Iran that stemmed from the 1979 hostage-taking had hardened into a one-dimensional view of the Islamic Republic as wholly malign. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and vicious rants against the existence of Israel confirmed Americans' worst fears. On the Iranian side, the list of real and p

archers came across a WikiLeaks cable that brilliantly foreshadowed how environmental stresses would fuel the uprising. Sent on Nov. 8, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus to the State Department, the cable details how, in light of what was a devastating Syrian drought — it lasted from 2006-10 — Syria's U