Epstein Secrets

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information Christian Hilbe11, Laura Schmid', Josef Tkadleca, Krishnendu Chatterjeee, and Martin A. Nowak" 'Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klostemeuburg, Austria; °Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 0

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s: Cooperation and bifurcation. Theor Popul Biol 73: 257-263. 208. Jones S, W Chen, G Parmigiani, F Diehl, N Beerenwinkel, T Antal, A Traulsen, MA Nowak, C Siegel, VE Velculescu, KW Kinzler, B Vogelstein, J Willis, SD Markowitz (2008). Comparative lesion sequencing provides insights into tumor evolut

(2006). Early maternal investment in mice: No evidence for 'compatible-genes' sexual selection despite hybrid vigor. J Evol Biol 19: 922-928. 144. Santos FC, JM Pacheco, T Lenaens (2006). Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput Biol 2: e140. 145. Santos FC, JM Pacheco

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