Epstein Secrets

ng principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Whether to investigate po

ntervention as of right."); United Stalest. AT & T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.1980); Sackman I. Liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 6, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In allowing intervention, this Court notes that Garfinkel and Katzman have not demonstrated that Rosenbaum in fact served as their lawyer

hought processes of Plaintiffs attorneys will be revealed. See also In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 119 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1988) (book of photographs, compiled by plaintiff's attorney, showing various forms of asbestos to which plaintiff had been exposed, was d

g principle that It]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large pan to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

mergency Petition and Petitioners' Motion seeking a finding that the CVRA was violated. The only material fact is that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida never filed federal 'Whether or not the CV RA applies is the central question in dispute in this matter because no federal criminal case

0736-KAM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 9 plea proceedings. Id., citing United States,. Ingrassia, 2005 WL 2875220 at •17 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2005). The district court concluded, "[t]he CVRA, therefore, dots not authorize an unbridled gallop to any and all information in the gover

President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547)

F.3d at 1081 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831). That type of inquiry is exactly the one requested by Jane Does #1 and #2 — did the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida violate the CVRA. Here, Petitioners' request should be examined with even greater caution than the average agency decision because it in

nalysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Judicial deference [94] to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of

against Epstein for many federal sex offenses," (DE 266 at 8), the Government responded: The government admits that the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida CUSAO") conducted an investigation into Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") and developed evidence and information in contemplation of a potenti

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

vant because they "show why the victims did not receive proper notifications about the non-prosecution agreement that the [United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida] negotiated with Epstein." (DE 266 at 11). The Court concludes that the materials are not relevant in that regard. First, the Court find

d "some evidence tending to show the existence" of the essential elements of a due process violation. Id., ECF No. 37 at 5 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996)). The government pointed to a standard typically applied in suppression cases—i.e., that discovery is appropriate only "i

or girls experienced horrible sexual abuse and rape in Florida. But then Epstein was given a slap-on- the-wrist deal in 2008 from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and some of his co- conspirators were shielded from prosecution. To make matters even worse, that deal seems to have been the product of

President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547)

F.3d at 1081 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831). That type of inquiry is exactly the one requested by Jane Does #1 and #2 — did the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida violate the CVRA. Here, Petitioners' request should be examined with even greater caution than the average agency decision because it in

selective prosecution defense, he has not met the "rigorous" standard that applies for obtaining discovery in aid of such a claim. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996). "[A] defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory ef

esting that the BOP was involved in the investigation or prosecution of this case." United States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149, 2015 WL 1540517, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015); see, e.g., United States v. Merlin, 349 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Government did not violate Brady obligation in fa

selective prosecution defense, he has not met the "rigorous" standard that applies for obtaining discovery in aid of such a claim. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996). "[A] defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory ef

esting that the BOP was involved in the investigation or prosecution of this case." United States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149, 2015 WL 1540517, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015); see, e.g., United States v. Merlin, 349 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Government did not violate Brady obligation in fa

selective prosecution defense, he has not met the "rigorous" standard that applies for obtaining discovery in aid of such a claim. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996). "[A] defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory ef

esting that the BOP was involved in the investigation or prosecution of this case." United States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149, 2015 WL 1540517, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015); see, e.g., United States v. Merlin, 349 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Government did not violate Brady obligation in fa