Epstein Secrets

06), but in practice the reported cases under the CVRA thus far show few examples where the government has been willing to do so. See, e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (victims' assertion of right affirmed; government does not take a position on t

lose the identity of its witnesses before trial. However, the basis for such grants of authority now seems defunct. For instance, in United States v. Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit recognized no authority exists in the federal rules for requiring the government to disclose the names of its witnesses. 74 Still,

disclosure of witness names before trial appears inconsistent with the federal rules. And even if the Ninth Circuit's approach was valid at the time Armstrong was decided, such an approach is no longer valid in light of the CVRA. Rule 57(b) only provides a basis for court authority in the absence of control

ir feelings at the voting polls."); cf. Chenev v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) ("The decision to

97 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause). ° United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456-71 (1996) (examining selective prosecution claim based on racial bias); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

ered useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at which the right had to be asserted."). 133 See United States v. Guevara-Toloso, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9762 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that CVRA requires notice to victims of the crime charged against the defendant but not notice to victims of any p

246 150 Cong. Rec. $10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). 247 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 248 150 Cong. Rec. $4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added). 249 See 18 U.S.C.