Epstein Secrets

F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) passim Mitchell v. Fishbein, 227 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 15 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) 10 Nixon v. Warner Corn:wins, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) 10 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) 10 Savitt v. Vacco, No. 95-CV-1

Herald's motion to intervene and unseal all sealed or redacted docket entries should be granted. Dated: April 6, 2018 Respectfully Submitted, /s Christine N. Walz HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP Sanford L. Bohrer Christine N. Walz 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Telephone: 212.513.3200 Fax: 212.385.9010 Att

t to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Nixon v. Warner Commtans, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,599 (1978). The panel lacks the context and familiarity with the facts, the parties and the non-parties to a

utah.edu) United States District Court for the Sigrid S. McCawley Southern District of New York ([email protected]) (via United States mail) Christine N. Walz ([email protected]) Madelaine J. Harrington ([email protected]) Sanford L. Bohrer ([email protected]) Andrew G. Celli

to exercise its sound discretion whether to seal or redact the materials "in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case," Nixon v. Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978). II. General objections to unsealing of summary judgment materials. As an initial matter, it i

ng persons: The Hon. Robert W. Sweet District Judge United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (via United States mail) Christine N. Walz ([email protected]) Madelaine J. Harrington ([email protected]) Sanford L. Bohrer ([email protected]) Paul G. Cassell

as the potential to exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that damaging material irrevocably enters the public record. 9 Nixon v. Inisner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). 10 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text, post. We therefore

from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge). Attorneys and Law Firms Sanford L. Bohrer (Christine N. Walz, Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL, for Intervenors-Appellants Julie Brown and Miami Herald.

s' responsibility to exercise these powerful tools. We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in judicial pleadings. 9 Nixon v. Warner Cotnmens, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 1° See notes 46-47 and accompanying text, post. 10 EFTA00092317 A. Standard of Review When

er concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a remand. SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz, Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL, for Intervenors-Appellants Julie Brown and Miami Herald.

and Law Firms Counsel for Interveners Julie Brown & Miami Herald Media Company: HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, 31 West 52nd Street, New York, NY 10019, By: Christine N. Walz, Esq., Sanford L. Bohrer, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff : BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP, 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200, Fort Lauderdale, FL 3

ch as using records "to gratify spite or promote scandals" or where files might serve "as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption." Nixon v. Warner Commcins, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); see also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks an

Stan J. Pottinger EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC 425 North Andrews Ave., Ste. 2 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 brad @pathtojustice.com [email protected] Christine N. Walz HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 [email protected] Paul G. Cassell 383 S. University Street Salt Lake City,

atify private spite or promote public scandal" or "serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption." Brown, 929 F.3d at 51 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commens, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). The Brown court held: "District courts should exercise the full range of their substantial powe