Epstein Secrets

-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's duty to see the faithful execution of the laws"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[t]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive B

econd-guess the Executive's exercise of discretion over the initiation and dismissal of criminal charges." Id. at 738. 45 EFTA00299065 Although Fokker addressed DPAs, the same principles apply with even greater to force to NPAs, which typically involve no judicial supervision. By imposing the Epste

Accordingly, judicial authority is "at its most limited when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." Id. In Fokker, the question before the D.C. Circuit was whether the district court had the power to decline to enter a speedy trial waiver because it believed tha

ited States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions and concluding that "[n]othing in the [Speedy Trial Act's] terms or structure suggests any intention to subvert t

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00211728 As to the third time period, when the Government found out on Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15

ited States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions and concluding that "[n]othing in the [Speedy Trial Act's] terms or structure suggests any intention to subvert t

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The II EFTA00799835 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 408 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/06/2017 Page 12 of 32 As to the third time p

ited States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions and concluding that "[n]othing in the [Speedy Trial Act's] terms or structure suggests any intention to subvert t

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00591472 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 401-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/02/2017 Page 13 of 33 As to the third tim

erogatives. The USAO-SDFL has been actively engaged in this litigation and has filed dozens of pleadings. Any issues regarding interference with the Executive branch have, no doubt, been properly advanced by that Office — and Epstein is simply an interloper who is not free to kibitz on constitutional issu

s. To be sure, judicial authority is limited "when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." United States v. Fokker Servs. B. V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016). But Jane Doe 1 and 2 are not asking this Court to review any prosecutor's ultimate charging deter