Epstein Secrets

-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's duty to see the faithful execution of the laws"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[t]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive B

titution's delegation of "take Care" duties, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and the pardon power, id. § 2, to the Executive Branch. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 . . . (1996); In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 262-63 (D.C.Cir.2013). Decisions to initiate charges, or to dismiss charges once

ing decisions, the choice to resolve a case through a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement “resides fundamentally with the Executive” branch. Id. at 741. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard in the USAM prohibiting the use of a non- prosecution agreement in the circumsta

esident’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). Unless based on an impermissible standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary

need for further legislative action or even, possibly, a federal constitutional amendment. Congress is watching to see whether the Judiciary (and the Executive) will fully and fairly implement this new Act. As Senator Leahy warned, "Passage of this bill will necessitate careful oversight of its implementatio

246 150 Cong. Rec. $10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases added). 247 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 248 150 Cong. Rec. $4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added). 249 See 18 U.S.C.