Epstein Secrets

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though t

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though t

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though t

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though t

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)). United States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal alterations omitted). Even though t