Epstein Secrets

l court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requi ment fly in the face of the two Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requirement fly in the face of the two Supreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seei

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requirement fly in the face of the two Supreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seei

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas--have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may no

uent travel, and that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate purposes that motivated his trips. See, e.g., Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562-63 ("[TJo say that, because [persons) indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which

law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is

Page 28 of 36 the same act are intended to have the same meaning.") (quotation and citation omitted). Two Mann Act cases are particularly apt. In Hansen', Half, 291 U.S. 559 (1934), the Government charged the defendant with violating the Mann Act after she returned to the country with a man with who

der the law that existed when the con uct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser Alum. & trt Corp . B mo 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the underlying conduct unless there is